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INTRODUCTION
In early May, the German Ethics Coun-
cil produced an in-depth report on the
oversight of dual-use research of concern
(DURC) (1). The report follows in the wake
of recent international emergency reviews
of avian influenza research and builds on
discussions, which have been taking place
internationally for over a decade (2).
In addition to calling for greater aware-
ness raising and education in the scientific
community, the report also calls for the
establishment of a new legal framework
to address DURC within Germany. This
framework would provide a legal definition
of DURC and would require researchers
to report to a newly established central
DURC committee before embarking on
certain lines of research. Such a legal frame-
work would also generate new responsibil-
ities for those outside the research team
who impact upon the research process;
from funding right through to publication.
For example, this would include new legal
responsibilities for Laboratory Biosecurity
Officers.
Such an approach would be in stark con-
trast to the patch-work of largely voluntary
measures, which are in place in the rest of
the world. The German Ethics Council has
also taken the view that Germany should
encourage the adoption of similar review
models at EU level and internationally.
DUAL-USE AND PRECAUTION
The summary report of the full 300 page
document produced by the German Ethics
Council, which is yet to be published in
English, notes that:
ethical analysis leads to the conclusion
that scientific responsibility in the area
of DURC is mainly to be governed by
the precautionary principle (emphasis
added) [Ref. (3), p. 3].
In essence, the precautionary principle
places the burden of proof upon the sci-
entific community to demonstrate that
research of DURC should be carried out,
and is being carried out in a responsi-
ble way. The precautionary principle tends
to be brought into play in the context of
complex risks, which are political chal-
lenges characterized by complexity, uncer-
tainly, and ambiguity [Ref. (4), p. 235].
Dual-use issues are complex as they do
not involve simple causal chains of events
with easily quantifiable consequences, but
rather a large set of intervening variables
with unknown or even unknowable conse-
quences. This is true not only in relation to
thinking about the harms of research, but
also its potential benefits. Dual-use issues
also involve uncertainty, as there is insuffi-
cient data or information to convincingly
produce risk verses benefit assessments of
single experiments or lines of research.
Dual-use issues are also ambiguous, as they
typically involve conflicts over ethical and
professional values.
Developing a legal and ethical frame-
work to address these issues requires intri-
cate webs of collaboration between institu-
tions, in the context of policy strategy and
design, as well as in the context implemen-
tation. This creates a challenging environ-
ment in which to develop and sustain pol-
icy initiatives, directed at problems, which
receive only periodic interest from publics
and governments.
The reassertion of the role of the pre-
cautionary principle in the context of dual-
use research provides suitable moment to
reflect on broader security concerns related
to emerging techno-sciences such as syn-
thetic biology, which extend beyond the
single experiments commonly described as
constituting DURC. These concerns relate
to trends, which could undermine existing
models of oversight (such as material and
technology containment strategies). This
includes concerns about the proliferation
of foundation technologies, which could be
utilized to modify or synthesize pathogens.
These concerns also relate to broader trends
in the underlying structures and fund-
ing of innovation (5). This includes con-
cerns about de-skilling and proliferation
dynamics in life-science research, which
could potentially undermine existent and
advocated approaches, which place empha-
sis on local level ethics review, as well as
laboratory safety and security (6).
Many of these broader concerns are
best thought of as anxieties rather than
risks, in that discussions about them
are largely speculative. However, non-
proliferation experts have been keen to
reassert, not only that new security chal-
lenges are inevitable, but also that existing
national and international systems of over-
sight are poorly prepared (7). It is in this
context that the field of synthetic biology
has become somewhat of a test-bed for
novel security initiatives. In the following
section, there is an introduction to how
dual-use concerns have emerged in relation
to the broader field of synthetic biology, as
well as some of the political realities facing
those developing policy in this area.
EMERGENCE OF DUAL-USE CONCERNS
ABOUT SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY IN A US
AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT
There have been discussions of secu-
rity concerns related to the practices and
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technologies of synthetic biology, as far
back as the community and institutions
of the field can be identified. This is per-
haps unsurprising, considering that the
field emerged in the post 9/11 political
environment. However, what is surprising
is the high levels of attention this field
has received as compared to other con-
temporary fields of innovation (such as
nano-biotechnology).
A key reason for this is that engagement
with misuse concerns has been a stipula-
tion of research funding in both the US
and the UK. The requirement to address
dual-use concerns was incorporated into
the National Science Foundation funding
criteria for synthetic biology, when the first
major publicly funded research center was
established [Ref. (8), p. 15]. This led to
the establishment of the first major ethical,
legal, and social issue (ELSI) thrust with
an explicit mandate to consider bioweapon
issues. As a result, such concerns also took
hold in a European context, as the field
was being institutionalized by the research
funding bodies. During these early stages
a broad range of misuse concerns were
under discussion, including those related to
the threat of bioterrorism and biowarfare
(9–11).
There are two key factors, which are
important to thinking about dual-use as an
ELSI issue. The first is that dual-use con-
cerns have been a novel addition to more
traditional ELSI concerns associated with
new and emerging science and technol-
ogy (such as safety). This means that the
issue often competes with more established
issues on the ELSI agenda. Security con-
cerns have been more dominant in a US
context, but less pronounced in a Euro-
pean ELSI context (12). Added to this,
misuse concerns have emerged at a time
in which the very concept and practice of
ELSI governance is being made subject to
transformation.
Both funders and society are increas-
ingly demanding “up-stream” engagement
by ELSI thrusts with the innovation process
[Ref. (8), p. 15; Ref. (13)]. Up-stream
engagement with the innovation process
involves engineering safety and security
into technologies and research practices,
rather than just responding to the chal-
lenges raised by the products of innova-
tion. Up-stream engagement is also typ-
ically understood to involve pro-active
engagement with key regulators and stake-
holders to pre-emptively address poten-
tial ethical and legal concerns. Increasingly,
such engagement is understood as a part
of national government policy to address
forward looking concerns about new and
emerging science and technology (14, 15).
However, there are several characteris-
tics of dual-use politics, which de-limits
the scope and feasibility of such endeav-
ors, which have been reflected in the recent
history of dual-use synthetic biology gov-
ernance in a UK and US context.
FROM BROAD ANXIETIES TO NARROW
ACTIONS
The first issue is that despite some of the
regulatory back-lash myths, which linger
in the US and Europe, governments have
not tended to exhibit appetites to legis-
late specifically in relation to dual-use con-
cerns related to synthetic biology. Particu-
larly, with respect to those concerns, which
could not be addressed through incre-
mental amendments to law covering lab-
oratory security and safety. Such a situ-
ation is symptomatic of a more general
trend in dual-use governance in national
contexts, in which there is an absence of
clear institutional responsibility to develop
such policy programs. It is worth not-
ing, however, that even in the absence of
“top-down” approaches, regulatory bod-
ies can still play a fundamental role in
the fate of so-called “bottom-up” initia-
tives; by providing financial, political as
well as technical support. Such collabora-
tion is also essential if up-stream engage-
ment with the field is actually to result in
the development, adoption, and sharing of
best-practices nationally.
The second issue is that despite the
emphasis on up-stream engagement and
best practice sharing at institutions such
as SynBERC there has not been substantial
investment into systematic and nationwide
examinations of the way in which dual-
use issues are currently dealt with in dif-
ferent institutional contexts. This is even
the case in relation to the field of syn-
thetic biology. Such engagement is neces-
sary if policy discussions about cutting-
edge fields are going to be tied to concrete
risk identification and management activ-
ities in the institutions in which research
is taking place. It would seem that with-
out such data gathering, much discussion,
particularly in ELSI forum will be con-
demned to remain an exercise in “specu-
lative ethics” (16).
A final issue is that while considering
how to improve security practices at local
level is important, there is still a require-
ment for institutional capacities to identify
and respond to much more fundamental
trends in S&T, which go beyond the scope
of the local level review. In relation to syn-
thetic biology in the US for example, the
emphasis on the centrality of local level
review, has led to an artificial narrowing
of dual-use discussions. For example, the
so-called “Sloan Report” (17) still repre-
sents one of the most substantial and influ-
ential technical reviews of security con-
cerns related to synthetic biology. Yet this
report largely externalized those concerns,
which could not be identified and man-
aged at local level. Other major reports
produced in the US on synthetic biology
have also tended to adopt this framing
(14, 18).
In particular, the prospect of state level
misuse of advances in the life-sciences
in the development of weapons has been
largely absent from US discussions of syn-
thetic biology as a security concern. In
a European context, the issue has only
received substantial attention in more
recent years. A report on an expert meet-
ing hosted by the United Nations Interre-
gional Crime and Justice Research Insti-
tute (supported by the European Com-
mission), describes the various ways in
which developments in synthetic biology
could re-ignite military interest in biolog-
ical weapons and potentially undermine
existing oversight regimes at national and
international level (19).
Such concerns are particularly pressing
when one considers the existing challenges,
which face the international regime tasked
with preventing the development and use
of biological weapons. This includes the
absence of a system to verify state com-
pliance, which is unlikely to change. While
there is slightly more hope for improving
the science and technology review system
within the regime, improvements continue
to be frustrated by a range of bureaucratic
and diplomatic issues (20, 21).
CONCLUSION
To sum up, the point of this article was
not to argue that synthetic biology poses
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an imminent security threat, but instead to
argue that while our capacity to imagine
misuse scenarios is boundless, our insti-
tutional capacities to engage with the less
whimsical of these concerns remains quite
limited, and developments in policy in this
area have been hard won. For some this
will not be a cause for alarm, but for oth-
ers, particularly those with less faith in the
resilience of the current norm against bio-
logical weapons, this issue continues to be
a source of unease.
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